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Abstract
In this paper, I use condential UK corporate tax returns dataset from Her
Majestys Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to explore whether there are systematic
di¤erences in the amount of taxable prots that multinational and domestic com-
panies report. I estimate, using propensity score matching, that the ratio of taxable
prots to total assets reported by foreign multinational subsidiaries is 12.8 percent-
age points lower than that of comparable domestic standalones, which report their
ratio of taxable prots to total assets to be 25.2 percent. If we assume that all of
the di¤erence can be attributed to prot shifting, foreign multinational subsidiaries
shift over half of their taxable prots out of the UK. The di¤erence is almost en-
tirely attributable to the fact that a higher proportion of foreign multinational
subsidiaries report zero taxable prots (59.2 percent) than domestic standalones
(27.5 percent), suggesting a very aggressive form of prot shifting. Comparison of
propensity score matching results using accounting and taxable prots data reveals
that the extent of prot shifting estimated using accounting data is much smaller
than that estimated using tax returns data.
JEL: H25, H32, Key words: tax payments, UK tax revenues, multinational
companies
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1 Introduction
Following the nancial crisis, the issues of aggressive tax avoidance and prot shifting by
corporations became more prominent in policy debates as authorities around the world
saw combatting tax avoidance as one of the important means of recovering from the
scal consequences of the crisis. For example, the United Kingdom has introduced the
Diverted Prots Tax in April 2015 aimed at taxing prots shifted abroad by multinational
companies.1 UK also announced limits to interest deductibility one of many ways in
which corporations minimize their tax payments from April 2017.2 More generally,
in 2015 the OECD countries have agreed to jointly reduce the extent of prot shifting
via the Base Erosion and Prot Shifting (BEPS) project.3 The media has also shown
increased appetite for naming and shamingmany familiar multinational companies, such
as Starbucks and Amazon, for paying too little tax.
The question remains as to whether it is only the very large multinationals that
avoid paying corporation tax, or even whether it is only those for which we have public
information available, or do all multinational do so. In this paper, I analyze a universe of
condential corporate tax returns to consider the taxable prots that companies reported
to Her Majestys Revenue & Customs (HMRC) during the period 2000 to 2011. In
particular, I focus on whether there are systematic di¤erences in the amount of taxable
prots that UK subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies (foreign multinational
subsidiaries) and standalone UK companies (domestic standalones) report.
This is the rst study to use the new administrative data, rather than accounting
data, to analyze the prot shifting practices of multinational companies residing in the
UK. Further, the availability of tax returns data allows me to explore a new phenomenon
- companies reporting zero taxable prots. I nd large bunching at zero taxable prots for
foreign multinational subsidiaries relative to domestic standalones, which is not observed
to the same extent in the accounting data.4
In this paper I focus on the di¤erences in the ratio of reported taxable prots to total
assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and comparable domestic standalones.
These two ownership categories are chosen with a view to compare two distinct groups
of companies, of which one has the ability to shift prots abroad (foreign multinational
subsidiaries) and one does not (domestic standalones). Specically, I analyze foreign
multinational subsidiaries which have no further subsidiaries themselves and which report
having positive trading turnover. I ensure that these selected companies are comparable
with domestic standalones in terms of their observable characteristics. What is more,
1HMRCs description of the diverted prots tax can be found at http://bit.ly/1sFOLcc.
2The UK 2016 Budget, p.56 (http://bit.ly/1R2QgNv).
3For the OECD report, see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm.
4Johannesen et al. (2016) nd that companies are more likely to report near-zero accounting prots
in their home country, the higher the average foreign tax rate of their subsidiaries is.
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since foreign multinational subsidiaries are generally larger and generate higher levels of
prots than domestic standalones, I use the ratio of taxable prots to total assets as a
main comparison measure between those two ownership types.5
In order to appropriately account for the di¤erence in size between foreign multina-
tional subsidiaries and domestic standalones, as well as the endogeneity problem arising
from self-selection into being a multinational, I adopt the propensity score matching ap-
proach (Paul R. Rosenbaum (1983), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)). I matchcompanies
based on the size of their assets and industry and nd that the unweighted mean ratio
of taxable prots to total assets for foreign multinational subsidiaries is 12.4 percent,
whereas for matched domestic standalones it is 25.2 percent, i.e. foreign multinational
subsidiaries report 12.8 percentage points lower taxable prots relative to total assets
than domestic standalones. If we attribute all of the di¤erence between these matched
samples of foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones to prot shifting,
then foreign multinationals shift over half of their taxable prots out of the UK.
The di¤erence between the matched samples of foreign multinational subsidiaries and
domestic standalones is almost entirely explained by the fact that a higher proportion of
foreign multinational subsidiaries report zero taxable prots (59.2 percent) than domestic
standalones (27.5 percent).6 In particular, 85 percent of the average di¤erence in the
ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and
domestic standalones can be attributed to foreign multinational subsidiaries reporting
zero taxable prots. When restricting the sample to companies which report positive
taxable prots, the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between the
ownership types is small and insignicant. Once foreign multinational subsidiaries decide
to report positive taxable prots, their reporting behaviour does not di¤er from that of
domestic standalones.
One possible explanation for the large number of zero taxable prot reporting multi-
nationals is that foreign multinational subsidiaries, unlike domestic standalones, are able
to use various methods of prot shifting, such as debt shifting, patent or royalty location
or transfer pricing to minimize their taxable prots in the UK (Dharmapala (2014)).7 An
example of debt shifting is when a UK subsidiary of a foreign multinational borrows from
its parent company in a low tax country so as to reduce its taxable prots (tax base) in
the UK (since interest payments are tax deductible), subject to Controlled Foreign Com-
5See Habu (2017) for a discussion of various measures to compare taxable prots of multinational and
domestic companies.
6The taxable prots are either zero or positive in the tax returns form; negative prots are reported
as zeros. Hence, the data is censored at zero. We can recover taxable losses from the back of the tax
returns form, but only the portion of the losses which is related to trading activities. I discuss this
further in the empirical section.
7This supports the evidence from Johannesen et al. (2016) who use bunching of the ratio of accounting
prots to total assets around zero to estimate the extent of prot shifting of multinationals in Europe.
They nd that reporting near-zero accounting prots may be linked with aggressive tax avoidance by
multinational companies and is related to the tax rate of their foreign parent.
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pany (CFC) rules.8 This increases the tax base in the lower tax country, so as to reduce
the overall tax burden for the company. In a similar way, multinational can use transfer
pricing to reduce its total tax liability; i.e. purchase goods from its foreign subsidiary
at higher than a market price (Grubert (2003), Markle (2012)).9 Finally, multinationals
often set up subsidiaries in low tax countries where they hold a large proportion of their
intellectual property, which they then license to their subsidiaries in higher tax coun-
tries, such as the UK. In this paper, I nd that in the UK domestic standalones report
14 percentage points lower leverage than comparable foreign multinational subsidiaries.
Further, 40 percent of the gap in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign
multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones can be explained by the di¤erences
in leverage between ownership types. When restricting the sample to companies which
report positive taxable prots, the di¤erence in leverage between ownership types is re-
duced to 7 percentage points. This is consistent with the hypothesis that some companies
use leverage to reduce their taxable prots to zero.
The large number of zero taxable prot reporting foreign multinational subsidiaries
suggests a very aggressive form of prot shifting for some foreign multinationals. More-
over, a puzzle emerges, as I cannot identify any major di¤erences in observable rm level
characteristics between tax-payers and non tax-payers. This may suggest that rms in-
stead di¤er in their unobservable characteristics such as their ability to shift prots or
reputational costs of aggressive tax planning10.
There are other possible explanations for why I nd such a large di¤erence in the ratio
of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic
standalones, which are unrelated to prot shifting. In this paper, I empirically test their
importance and nd that only leverage explains a signicant portion of the di¤erence in
the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between the analyzed ownership types. In turn, I
nd that foreign multinational subsidiaries, in spite of reporting lower taxable prots, are
actually 25 percent more productive than domestic standalones. This suggests that the
di¤erences in protability between ownership types do not arise because of the di¤erences
in productivity.11
8"The CFC rules are anti-avoidance provisions designed to prevent diversion of UK prots to low
tax territories. If UK prots are diverted to a CFC, those prots are apportioned and charged on
a UK corporate interest-holder that holds at least a 25% interest in the CFC." For more details see
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlled-foreign-company-an-overview
9For a detailed analysis of prot shifting using transfer pricing by multinationals see Liu and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2017). They use tax and trade linked data from the HMRC to look at transfer pricing strategies
of multinational companies.
10The accounting literature identies a relationship between rms CEO who may be an aggressive tax
planner and the amount of accounting prots that a rm reports (Armstrong et al. (2012), Armstrong
et al. (2015)).
11For the discussion of other possible factors that could a¤ect the size of the gap in the ratio of taxable
prots to total assets between domestic standalones and foreign multinational subsidiaries see Habu
(2017). These are, for instance, losses made in this or previous periods or di¤erent industry and size
distributions.
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The di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multina-
tional subsidiaries and domestic standalones are related to traditional measures associated
with prot shifting. In the previous literature the extent to which rms prot is related
to leverage, tax rates or rm structure, such as a presence of tax havens, has been used as
an indicator of prot shifting (Hines and Rice (1994)). In this paper, I nd that, for in-
stance, foreign multinational subsidiaries headquartered in tax havens report much lower
taxable prots in the UK relative to domestic standalones than foreign multinational
subsidiaries headquartered in higher tax countries. If we consider being headquartered
in a tax haven as a sign of being a prot shifter, this suggests that companies which are
more likely to be shifting prots out of the UK, report the lowest ratios of taxable prots
to total assets in the UK.
I nd that the UK corporate tax rate cuts did not have an e¤ect on the ratio of
taxable prots to total assets reported by foreign multinational subsidiaries relative to
that reported by domestic standalones. If marginal cost of shifting prots abroad is equal
to marginal benets, we would expect a cut in the domestic corporate tax rate to reduce
the marginal benet of shifting prots abroad. This could induce a company to report
higher taxable prots in the UK. The fact that I nd no such response, suggests that the
cost of reducing taxable prots may not be a convex function of rms prots. Instead,
it points towards rms in my sample having xed cost of shifting prots. This is also
consistent with the fact that the zero taxable prots reporting pattern is prevalent for
foreign multinational subsidiaries, as those companies may be inelastic to changes in the
corporate tax rates, in so far as they already report zero taxable prots.
Previous studies, which used accounting prots to proxy for taxable prots, may have
underestimated the extent of prot shifting by multinational companies. To compare
taxable and accounting prots I include in taxable prots, which are otherwise censored
at zero, trading losses that companies report in the tax returns form. I nd that companies
which report positive prots, report signicantly higher accounting prots than taxable
prots.12 Further, bunching at zero (or near-zero) prots is much stronger in the tax
returns data than in the accounting data. Both of those di¤erences are systematically
larger for foreign multinational subsidiaries, which suggests that they may be driven by
factors unrelated to reporting standards and instead may be an indication of aggressive
tax planning practices of multinational companies. Comparison of the propensity score
matching results using accounting and taxable prots data reveals that the extent of the
gap in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets estimated using accounting data is much
12The di¤erence between what companies report on their accounting statements and the taxable prots
they report is to be expected (Desai and Dharmapala (2009)) due to the di¤erences in accounting
standards and tax reporting standards. This is partly due to the fact that accounting depreciation tends
to be less generous than tax depreciation, which means that after taking into account capital allowances,
accounting prots can be expected to be higher than taxable prots (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010),
Dharmapala (2014)).
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smaller than that estimated using tax returns data.
The advantage of the work presented in this paper over previous approaches is three-
fold. First, unlike most of the prot shifting literature, which uses accounting prots as a
proxy for taxable prots, I use administrative data on taxable prots directly from the tax
returns. Secondly, I select the sample of foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic
standalones from a full population of UK companies. This means that I have larger
than previously analyzed sample of comparable companies. Finally, previous approaches
have focused on studying the relationship between tax rates and logarithm of prots to
estimate the extent of prot shifting of multinational companies (see Dharmapala (2014)
for review of the literature). Using the logarithm of prots means that these studies have
implicitly concentrated their analysis on the positive taxable prots.13 In this paper, I
show that the most important aspect of understanding how much taxable prots foreign
multinational subsidiaries report, is the zero taxable prot reporting behaviour.
Egger et al. (2010) use accounting data to show that multinationals earn signicantly
higher prots than comparable domestic rms in low tax countries, but earn signicantly
lower prots in high tax countries. They dene low tax countries as countries with
statutory tax rates lower than the median in their sample. Given that the UK was a
relatively high tax country during the sample period, their ndings would suggest that
multinationals operating in the UK would report lower accounting prots than domestic
companies. If we assume that accounting prots are a good proxy for taxable prots, this
is consistent with my nding that foreign multinational subsidiaries report lower ratios
of taxable prots to total assets than domestic standalones.
In what follows, section 2 briey describes the data used in this paper, section 3 out-
lines the empirical methodology and the challenges associated with it, section 4 discusses
the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Data description and sample selection criteria
The primary data source used in this paper is the condential universe of unconsolidated
corporation tax returns in the UK for the years 2000 - 2011 provided by HMRC. The
dataset comprises all items that are submitted on the corporation tax return form (CT600
form) and the unit of observation is an unconsolidated statement in each of the years.
The HMRC data does not o¤er any rm level characteristic variables, apart from trading
turnover. Therefore I merge the HMRC data with the accounting data from the FAME
dataset. FAME dataset, collected by Bureau van Dijk, provides balance sheet information
for UK companies. For instance, it gives me information on total assets, accounting
13The prot shting literature does not directly omit the negative and zero prots from their analysis.
Instead, they often add a constant to the prots number and hence they do include negative and zero
prots. However, this does not enable them to study the zero prots phenomenon directly.
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prots, age of rms, number of employees, industry or leverage.
Matching the HMRC data with accounting data restricts the sample size. I nd a
matched unconsolidated accounting statement in FAME for 76 percent of unconsolidated
tax returns from the HMRC data, which includes 89 percent of the total tax liability
and 92 percent of total trading turnover in the UK. I further ensure that I have non-
missing total assets information and full 12 months accounting period for each matched
HMRC-FAME observation.14
The FAME dataset also includes information on rm ownership, which I use to identify
rms into various ownership categories. The FAME ownership dataset is a cross section
from the latest edition of the dataset (2013). For the purpose of this paper, I focus on
two distinct ownership categories, UK subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies
which are subsidiaries of multinational companies that have headquarters outside of the
UK; and UK standalone domestic companies, which are independent companies with no
a¢ liates. These two types of companies constitute about 30 percent of the total taxable
prots in the UK and hold 50 percent of total assets. Their observable characteristics
are similar to other types of multinationals and domestic companies, which makes them
representative of the ownership classes they were chosen from. I have chosen those two
groups of companies with a view to nd the two most comparable ownership groups,
of which one has the ability to shift prots abroad (foreign multinational subsidiaries)
and one does not (domestic standalones). To strengthen their comparability, I limit the
foreign multinational subsidiaries sample to include a¢ liates with zero subsidiaries and
with positive trading turnover.
The total number of foreign multinational subsidiaries in the sample is 270,000, of
which 200,000 have no subsidiaries themselves. This means that I exclude from the
main analysis around 25 percent of foreign multinational subsidiaries. This addresses
two possible concerns: appropriate asset size and presence of overseas income. The total
assets numbers that multinationals with zero subsidiaries report is not a¤ected by the
equity value of their subsidiaries, as they report to have none.15 Also, the e¤ect of overseas
income on their taxable prots should be negligible after including only companies with
no subsidiaries.16 ;17
14For a detailed description of the HMRC-FAME matched dataset see Habu (2017).
15Note that the ratio of taxable prots to total asstes increases for the foreign multinational subsidiaries
sample as I introduce the addtional selection criteria. This is consistent with the total assets number
being larger than the size of the operations of foreign multinational subsidiaries with subsidiaries in the
UK.
16Some of the foreign multinational subsidiaries that report to have no subsidiaries themselves have
reported overseas income in the UK. This may be because my ownership data may not capture the
ownership structure of companies perfectly.
17The concern here could be that the treatment of overseas income has changed following the 2009
dividend tax reform, after which rms were no longer required to report overseas income on their tax
returns. This could create a discord between the taxable prots of multinationals with overseas income
before and after 2009. What is more, part of the overseas income was sheltered by double tax relief in
the UK. This means that multinational companies only paid tax on part of the reported overseas income.
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Further, I ensure that foreign multinational subsidiaries selected for the analysis re-
port having positive trading turnover in the UK. Out of 200,000 foreign multinational
subsidiaries with no subsidiaries themselves, just under 150,000 also report to have pos-
itive trading turnover. This means that they have trading activities in the UK and do
not exist solely as holding companies to transfer prots between company a¢ liates.
Sample size has plagued previous studies as important parts of the economy were
omitted by excluding small rms. Accounting datasets generally report missing data
for a large portion of observations. I am the rst to use the HMRC tax returns data
with universal coverage to solve this problem. When estimating the size of the di¤erence
in taxable prots between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones
I additionally rely on accounting information to obtain total asset gures. In contrast
to information on accounting prots, data on total assets has substantially better cover-
age.18 Therefore, in my propensity score matching analysis, I have larger than previously
analyzed sample of foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones. I am
able to nd comparable domestic standalone companies not only for large foreign multi-
national subsidiaries, but also for smaller foreign multinational subsidiaries, for which a
large number of comparable domestic standalones exists.
In my empirical analysis I do not consider domestic multinationals for two distinct
reasons. First, one may think that they would be a good comparison group for foreign
multinational subsidiaries. However, since domestic multinationals have similar oppor-
tunities to shift prots abroad as foreign multinationals, the size of the di¤erence be-
tween these two groups would not give me any information on the potential size of prot
shifting. On the other hand, they may present an interesting comparison with domes-
tic standalones. However, the size of the total assets of domestic multinationals in my
dataset is not a good approximation of the size of their operations in the UK. This is
because all but a few of the domestic multinational observations in the selected sample
report having at least one subsidiary, either foreign or domestic.19 This means that the
total assets gures in unconsolidated accounts of those companies may include the equity
value of those subsidiaries, while their taxable prots do not include taxable prots of
the subsidiaries. Thus, the ratio of their taxable prots to total assets will be biased
The exclusion of the sheltered portion of overseas income from the taxable prots would decrease the
numerator of the taxable prots to total assets ratio for multinational companies which receive overseas
income. To allieviate this concern the main empirical analysis is performed using foreign multinational
subsidaries with zero subsidiaries themselevs and in any case only 2.6% of the analysed sample has
reported to bring any overseas income to the UK. Therefore the issue of including overseas income which
is sheltered by double tax relief in the taxable prot measure is not a major one. I test this further in
the empirical analysis.
18For instance, out of 150,000 foreign multinational subsidiaries for which I have total assets and taxable
prots information, only 65,000 have reported prots information in their accounting statements.
19This is the case for both parent companies and their subsidiaries alike. This is not the case for
foreign multinational subsidiaries, as only 25 percent of them report to have subsidiaries themselves and
those I exclude from the sample.
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downwards relative to companies with no subsidiaries which report the same taxable
prots. Therefore those companies might not be as comparable to domestic standalones
in terms of the main variable of interest as foreign multinational subsidiaries without
any subsidiaries are. Further, half of domestic multinationals report only consolidated
accounts in the FAME dataset.20
I also do not focus the empirical analysis on the di¤erences between foreign multi-
national subsidiaries and domestic groups. The exclusion of domestic groups from the
empirical analysis comes from the fact that I cannot identify those types of companies
with certainty. I can say with condence that they are not domestic standalones, but due
to missing ownership data, it is entirely plausible that a company that I have classied
as a domestic group based on the lack of foreign income and the presence of domestic
parent and no foreign subsidiaries, is actually a foreign multinational subsidiary.
2.1 Descriptive statistics
In this section I present descriptive evidence on the di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prof-
its to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones.
In Figure 1 I plot the weighted mean ratios of taxable prots to total assets for the two
analyzed groups. Specically, I sum up all taxable prots in each year for each ownership
type and do the same for total assets. I then divide one sum over the other to obtain the
weighted means. In Panel A I consider the whole sample of observations for both own-
ership types. In Panel B I consider only companies of similar size, excluding very large
foreign multinational subsidiaries for which no comparable domestic standalones exist
and excluding very small domestic standalones for which no comparable foreign multi-
national subsidiaries exist. In Panel C I further impose a restriction that the companies
considered in Panel B report positive taxable prots only.
I nd that in the raw data, domestic standalones report 6 times higher ratio of taxable
prots to total assets than foreign multinational subsidiaries. When I compare companies
of similar sizes, by excluding the very large multinationals and the very small domestic
companies, they report more comparable taxable prots. The di¤erence in the ratio of
taxable prots to total assets between the two ownership types in Panel B is about 4
percentage points; foreign multinational subsidiaries report their ratio of taxable prots
to total assets to be 8 percent, while domestic standalones report that to be 12 percent.
Further, excluding companies which report zero taxable prots (almost 60 percent of for-
eign multinational subsidiaries and 27.5 percent of domestic standalones) we can see that
the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational
20An alternative would be to use trading turnover reported in the tax return form as a measure of size
for domestic multinationals. However, this is not possible as trading turnover for domestic multinationals
is almost always missing (likely because companies are not required to report turnovers). It means that
I have no data source to approximate the size of domestic multinationals in the UK.
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subsidiaries and domestic standalones disappears. Moreover, in the second half of the
sample period foreign multinational subsidiaries which report positive taxable prots, re-
port higher taxable prots than domestic standalones which also report positive taxable
prots.
Figure 1: Taxable prots comparisons: foreign multinational subsidiaries vs domestic
standalones.	
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Note: Di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries
and domestic standalones, The ratios are calculated by summing up all taxable prots of a particular
ownership category in each year and dividing these by the sum of total assets of that paritcular ownership
category in that particular year. Years used 2000 - 2011, selected sample. Source: merged HMRC and
FAME data.
3 Empirical methodology
In this section I describe the empirical strategy I use to estimate the size of the di¤erence
in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between domestic standalones and foreign
multinational subsidiaries. The most straightforward and commonly used in the liter-
ature approach would be to use panel estimators, such as pooled OLS or within rm
transformation to estimate the average di¤erence in the taxable prots relative to to-
tal assets between multinationals and domestic standalones. Previous approaches have
used changes in the tax rate di¤erential between countries to identify the relationship
between tax rates and reported accounting prots (the approaches following Hines and
Rice (1994)).
However, this yields two types of biases. Firstly, foreign multinational subsidiaries are
much larger than domestic standalones, hence, the OLS results may include companies
which are not of comparable size. The evidence from Habu (2017) shows that the very
large multinationals report lower ratios of taxable prots to total assets than smaller
multinationals for which comparable domestic standalones exist. Conversely, very small
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domestic standalones report higher ratios of taxable prots to total assets than larger do-
mestic standalones for which comparable foreign multinational subsidiaries exist. Hence,
the OLS results on the whole sample may be upward biased. Secondly, foreign multi-
national subsidiaries and domestic standalones di¤er not only in terms of size, but also
across other observable characteristics. For instance, trade literature over the last decades
has documented that multinational and domestic rms di¤er in terms of productivity, size
and wages (Harrison and Aitken (1999), Javorcik (2004), Sabirianova et al. (2005), Yasar
and Morrison Paul (2007)).21 This suggests that there may be a selection into being a
multinational company that is a function of observable rm level characteristics.
The econometric approach that has been used extensively in trade and industrial eco-
nomics literature to alleviate the two concerns raised above has been a non-parametric
matching method.22 This method calculates predicted probabilities of being in the treat-
ment group based on observable rm level characteristics and nds observations with
similar propensity scores from treatment and control groups. Instead of comparing the
average di¤erences between two groups of companies, the propensity score matching
method compares companies with similar propensity scores and calculates the average
di¤erence using the comparable pairs.
In the rst stage a logit model is estimated with multinational dummy on the left hand
side and determinants of being a multinational company on the right hand side. I use
this regression to calculate the predicted probabilities of being a multinational company
for each observation. These are called propensity scores (Paul R. Rosenbaum (1983),
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)).
multinationali = i + Kit + indi + yeart + it: (1)
where multinationali is a multinational dummy equal to 1 if a company is a multina-
tional and 0 otherwise, Kit is a set of determinants of being a multinational, indi and
yeart are industry and year xed e¤ects. I use a nearest neighborhood matching strategy
within a 0.1 caliper radius without replacement, which for each foreign multinational
subsidiary nds a closest comparable domestic standalone within the 0.1 radius in terms
of the propensity score.23 That particular domestic standalone is used only once, hence
21This endogeneity has also been explored theoretically (Markusen and Venables (1998), Helpman et
al. (2004)).
22The non-parametric nature of the propensity score matching is important since it avoids misspeci-
cation of the equation as could be the case with OLS. To ensure OLS specication yields similar results to
matching, we would need to control for a fully exible industry size matrix. However, if OLS is correctly
specied, it is more e¢ cient (Hirano et al. (2003), Abadie and Imbens (2006)).
23Various robustness checks have been performed using di¤erent caliper and the results are not very
sensitive to the choice of the radius. William G. Cochran (1973) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)
suggest using a caliper width that is a proportion of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity
score, specically 0.2 of standard deviation was suggested to eliminate approximately 99% of the bias
due to the measured confounders. Since the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score is 0.5
in my baseline matching model, I choose 0.1 caliper width.
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the sample size of foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones used for
matching without replacement is the same.24 Furthermore, I impose a common support
restriction for total assets, hence no company larger than the largest domestic standalone
and no company smaller than the smallest foreign multinational is in the sample. This
last condition is crucial and makes the propensity score matching (PSM) method a pre-
ferred approach to OLS especially in the light of very di¤erent size distributions between
ownership types.
There are various other algorithms which can be used to obtain matched samples
based on propensity scores, such as kernel or radius. Radius matching uses all domes-
tic standalone companies with propensity scores within a certain radius from a given
multinational to estimate the size of the di¤erence. Kernel matching uses all domestic
standalones, but weights the control observations inverse-proportionally to the propen-
sity score di¤erence to the multinational company. Using more observations for matching
increases precision, but the more observations you use the less suitable they are as com-
parisons. This could lead to large biases. Since larger multinationals are not comparable
to smaller ones in terms of the ratio of their taxable prots to total assets, I use nearest
neighborhood matching to avoid large biases and trade o¤ e¢ ciency of the estimates.25
The critical di¢ culty of this paper is in nding the appropriate group of companies to
achieve the best matching possible. For each foreign multinational a¢ liate I want to nd
a comparable domestic standalone from the same industry of the same size. Therefore I
keep the set of matching variables as simple as possible and in the baseline results use
the following observable characteristics: industry, year and total assets.26
The propensity score generated in the rst stage divides the sample into a group of
"treated" foreign multinational subsidiaries for which a comparable domestic standalone
with a similar propensity score was found, and remaining companies, which constitute the
unmatched sample. Since the main outcome of interest is the ratio of taxable prots to
total assets, in the second stage a di¤erence in the mean ratios of taxable prots to total
assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones is estimated
using the matched sample (Paul R. Rosenbaum (1983)). This e¤ect is presented as the
average treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATT, Imbens (2004)). Hence, the ATT is the
percentage point di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign
multinational subsidiaries and domestic companies accounting for selection into being a
multinational. This approach is applied to alternative outcome variables as well.
24The replacement feature enables the same domestic standalone to be used as a comparable company
for foreign multinational subsidiaries multiple of times. This might be important in the right hand side
tail of the distribution where there are not very many large domestic standalones to create a comparable
group for foreign multinational subsidiaries. I test the robustness of the baseline estimates using the
replacement feature.
25For a detailed description of di¤erences in the size distributions between foreign multinational sub-
sidiaries and domestic standalones see Habu (2017).
26I check the robustness of the choice of the baseline matching variables in Section 2.4.1.
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The PSM results may be directly compared to the OLS estimates. However, this
hinges on including a fully exible size and industry interaction matrix together with
exclusion of companies outside of the overlapping regions. For more discussion on the
di¤erences between PSM and OLS see Appendix 6.1.
Habu (2017) documents large di¤erences in the proportions of observations that report
zero taxable prots between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones.
Therefore, the estimation of the unconditional means of the ratio of taxable prots to total
assets is not the only interesting margin of comparison between the ownership types. The
unconditional mean can be decomposed into the share of zeros and a mean conditional
on reporting positive taxable prots in the following way:
E(y) = (1  p)E(yjy = 0) + pE(yjy > 0) = 0 + pE(yjy > 0) = pE(yjy > 0) (2)
where p = prob(y > 0) and y = taxable protstotal assets :
27 This suggests dividing the analysis
into three main components; the unconditional mean of taxable prots relative to total
assets, the mean of taxable prots conditional on reporting positive taxable prots and
the binary outcome analysis of zero taxable prot reporting, that will directly estimate
p. Dropping observations with y = 0 and performing PSM is a rst attempt to consider
the conditional mean, while selectivity correction may be considered a renement. Since
applying selectivity correction does not change the main result relative to PSM, I do not
discuss it in the main body of the paper. For more details on the two-stage Heckman
selection approach and the results see Appendix 6.2.
The di¤erence in ATT between the unconditional and conditional means indicates
how much of the di¤erence in taxable prots between foreign multinational subsidiaries
and domestic standalones I can attribute to zero taxable prot reporting. Furthermore, I
consider zero taxable prots dummy dened as one when the company is reporting zero
taxable prots and zero otherwise as an outcome variable. The ATT coe¢ cient on that
outcome variable will tell me the di¤erence in the proportion of observations that are
reporting zero taxable prots between the two ownership types in the matched sample.
Another factor which may contribute to the di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones is
di¤erences in leverage.28 This leads me to consider leverage as an additional outcome
variable in the propensity score matching approach. I consider two measures of leverage,
total liabilities divided by total assets - stock measure of leverage - and net interest
27E(yjy = 0) is zero when y is reported taxable prots, censored at zero. However, UK tax system
allows carryforward of losses for tax purposes, which would mean that E(yjy = 0) may not be zero when
y measures the actual taxable prots. I discuss this particular feature of the UK tax system later in this
section.
28Higher leverage makes zero taxable prots more likely. Hence, di¤erences in leverage and the pro-
portion of zero taxable prots cannot be considered as separate factors.
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(interest paid minus interest received) divided by prot and loss before interest - ow
measure of gearing.
Furthermore, the propensity score matching approach allows me to calculate the pro-
portion of the di¤erence in taxable prots between foreign multinational subsidiaries and
domestic standalones that can be attributed to the di¤erences in leverage. To do so, in
the rst stage of PSM I use leverage as a matching variable. Therefore now, in the second
stage, I will be comparing companies of similar size with similar leverage. The di¤erence
in the ATT coe¢ cient between matching with and without leverage (on the same sample)
will give me the fraction of the di¤erence explained by leverage.
The question also arises whether we are only interested in taxable prots as they are
recorded on the tax return form, i.e. taxable prots=max(0; taxable income), or whether
we are also interested in the underlying taxable income, which may be either positive or
negative. This is conceptually unclear, given the asymmetric treatment of prots and
losses. In the UK tax system when a company makes a loss it does not receive a tax
credit on that loss, but instead records zero taxable income and hence pays no corporation
tax on that income. It is then allowed to bring some of the losses it made forward into
future periods and o¤set them against positive taxable prots, once it is protable again.
Alternatively, it can also bring the losses back one period and o¤set them against last
years prots, if those prots were positive. In the case of loss carryback the company
would receive tax credit in that particular year. When taxable prots are positive, the
corporation tax liability is paid. This means that the taxable prots are censored at zero.
What this implies for the purpose of this paper is that with fully symmetric treatment,
we would only be interested in the underlying taxable income, with fully asymmetric
treatment (no carry back or carryforward of losses), we would only be interested in the
recorded taxable prots (censored at zero). With the actual treatment (some carry back
and carryforward at nominal value) we may be interested in both. We can potentially
use additional information from the tax return, e.g. on losses, to recover or estimate the
underlying taxable income. One of the possible sources of information is trading losses in
the CT600 form, where rms have to report the amount of losses arising from their trading
activities. The advantage of this measure is that we could simply subtract those trading
losses from recorded taxable prot to recover some of the underlying taxable income.
This measure would be more closely related to tax payments in the same year. The
disadvantage is that we have no information on other sources of losses that companies
may be incurring, which means that we are introducing a measurement error into the
analysis. In the empirical analysis I primarily focus on the censored taxable prots as an
outcome variable. However, I discuss comparisons between taxable income and recorded
taxable prots measures when I compare propensity score matching results using taxable
and accounting prots.
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4 Results
In this section I present the results from propensity score matching. I then test their
robustness, discuss channels which companies use to lower their taxable prots and com-
pare my results with those using accounting prots. Finally, I consider the heterogeneity
of the estimated di¤erences.
The matching algorithm is based on size and industry, hence in the rst stage I esti-
mate a logit model using logarithm of total assets, 2 digit industry and year dummies.29
First, I use the propensity score from this baseline regression to perform the nearest neigh-
borhood matching procedure and look at the ATT from those estimations. The outcome
variables I consider are taxable prots divided by total assets, tax liabilities divided by
total assets, zero taxable prots dummy and taxable prots divided by total assets for
positive taxable prots only. I then limit the matching sample to positive taxable prots
only and repeat the matching exercise to obtain the ATT on the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets for that smaller sample.
Using the rst stage of PSM to create matched and unmatched samples, I rst present
descriptive statistics on foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones. I
show mean unweighted outcome variables, such as size (total assets and trading turnover)
and age. The results in Table 1 suggest that the matching procedure makes the two
analyzed ownership types more comparable to each other in terms of main observable
rm level characteristics. In the rst row of each panel I show that the two ownership
categories are very similar in terms of the matching variable (logarithm of total assets)
after matching is performed. Further, the di¤erences in the means of other observable
rm level characteristics between the two ownership types are insignicant in the matched
sample. Foreign multinational subsidiaries in the matched sample are on average smaller
than in the unmatched sample, while domestic standalones are larger, both in terms of
total assets and trading turnover. Foreign multinationals are younger in the matched
sample than in the unmatched one, while domestic standalones are older.
The third column in Table 2 shows the mean of treated observations: foreign multina-
tional subsidiaries, while column 4 presents the mean of control observations: domestic
standalones, both for matched sample. The average treatment e¤ect (ATT) is the di¤er-
ence between those two means. The last two columns show the number of observations
in both treated and control groups. The ATT estimates for the ratio of tax liabilities
29The PSM analysis assumes that we have matched on all relevant characteristics and that there is
no unobserved confounders that may account for the di¤erence across the treatment and control groups.
I test that assumption using Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum (2002), see Appendix
Table 8). The Roseunbaum analysis tests how much the unobserved covariate would need to increase
the odds of being a multinational company before we could attribute the di¤erence between foreign
multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones to unobserved factors. The results indicate that the
unobserved factor would need to increase the likelihood of being a multinational more than three times
before we could attribute the observed di¤erence in the outcome variables to that unobserved factors.
This suggests that the matching procedure is not sensitive to hidden bias.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
 foreign multinationals domestic standalones 
 whole sample 
log total assets  14.6   11.0  
total assets (million)  118.0   0.27  
trading turnover (million)  26.0   1.06  
log trading turnover  14.5   11.5  
age  20.6   13.3  
 matched sample 
log total assets  13.1   13.1  
total assets (million)  1.83   1.76  
trading turnover (million)  3.17   2.29  
log trading turnover  13.6   13.1  
age  17.9   19.8  
 unmatched sample 
log total assets  16.5   10.8  
total assets (million)  255.0   0.19  
trading turnover (million)  58.6   0.99  
log trading turnover  15.9   11.4  
age  23.7   12.9  	
Note: Unweighted means of observed rm level characteristics: comparison of whole,
matched and unmatched samples for foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic
standalones, Matched sample is created using propensity score matching methodol-
ogy described above, where I use total assets and industry as matching variables.
The di¤erences in the means of the observable rm level characteristics between
foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones are signicant in the
whole and unmatched samples. In the matched sample, the di¤erences in the means
of observable rm level characteristics between foreign multinal subsidiaries and do-
mestic standalones are insignicant for total assets, trading turnover and age. 2000
- 2011, selected sample. Trading turnover and total assets are in millions of pounds.
Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
and taxable prots to total assets in the baseline specication are negative and highly
signicant (standard errors are in the column titled SE). The di¤erence between domes-
tic standalones and foreign multinational subsidiaries is estimated to be 12.76 percentage
points for the ratio of taxable prots to total assets, while the di¤erence in the ratio of
tax liabilities to total assets is 2.51 percentage points. The mean of taxable prots rela-
tive to total assets for foreign multinational subsidiaries is 12.41 percent while that same
ratio is 25.17 percent for domestic standalones. This implies that foreign multinational
subsidiaries report just over 50 percent lower ratio of taxable prots to total assets and
46.7 percent lower ratio of tax liabilities to total assets.
The estimates of the di¤erence in the ratios of tax liabilities and taxable prots to
total assets are di¤erent. This is due to the proportion of small and medium companies
that pay lower tax rate in the UK. I match companies on size measured by total assets
rather than prots, the latter being the determinant of which tax band applies to a
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company.30 If all companies were subject to the same tax rate in the UK, the di¤erence
between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones for tax liabilities and
taxable prots should be the same. However, the UK has lower tax rate for small and
medium companies and these companies constitute a much larger proportion of domestic
standalones than foreign multinational subsidiaries. This is the case even after matching
procedure is applied, as the average tax rate is lower for domestic standalones than
for foreign multinational subsidiaries in both whole and matched samples.31 We would
expect domestic standalones on average to pay lower tax on the same taxable prots, if
they were subject to lower tax rate. Therefore we would expect the di¤erence between
multinationals and domestic standalones in terms of taxable prots to be larger than that
on tax.
Furthermore, the ratio of tax liability to total assets divided by the ratio of taxable
prots to total assets gives an implied tax rate. Comparison of those ratios for the treated
and control groups reveals that the implied tax rate for foreign mutational subsidiaries is
actually higher - 23 percent - than that for domestic standalones, 21.3 percent. The top
statutory tax rate in the UK for most of the sample duration was 30 percent. However, a
substantial portion of domestic standalones was subject to much lower, 20 percent, small
and medium statutory tax rate over the sample period in the UK. Therefore, absent prot
shifting, we would expect the di¤erence in the implied tax rates between the two groups
to be much larger.
I also nd that foreign multinational subsidiaries are 31.8 percentage points more
likely to report zero taxable prots in the matched sample; 56.7 percent of observations
in the foreign multinational subsidiaries category and 22.9 percent of observations in the
domestic standalones category report zero taxable prots. This leads me to explore the
mean taxable prots to total assets ratio conditional on making positive taxable prots
as an outcome variable. The ATT for the ratio of taxable prots to total assets is -1.45
percentage points and is insignicant, while the ATT for the ratio of tax liabilities to
total assets turns positive and is also insignicant. This means that over 85 percent of
the di¤erence in taxable prots between the two ownership types can be attributed to
the di¤erences in the proportions of companies reporting zero taxable prots.32
30For more details on which tax rates apply to which types of companies see:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax/rates-and-
allowances-corporation-tax
31The average tax rate is calculated as the ratio of tax liability to taxable prots in the tax returns
data. If all companies were subject to the top statutory tax rate, this ratio would be equal to the top
statutory tax rate. However, small and medium companies in the UK were subject to lower - 20 percent -
corporate tax rate during the sample period. Hence, we would expect the average tax rate for of domestic
standalones to be lower than for foreign multinational subsidiaries.
32Alternatively, I do PSM on all companies and present the results for conditional mean of taxable
prots to total assets. The results for matching on the baseline sample, but using restricted outcome
variable show the ATT estimate to be -1.89 percent which is not statistically signicantly di¤erent from
the one obtained doing PSM on the resticted sample.
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4.1 Robustness checks
In this section I test the robustness of the baseline estimates of the di¤erence in the ratio
of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic
standalones (Table 3). I rst consider how various rst stage matching specications
a¤ect the main result. I use non-linear forms of total assets, such as square and cube
of the logarithms. Instead of matching within each year, I use a cross-section regression
with one observation for each rm, and with the average logarithm of total assets over the
sample period to identify the matched observations, i.e. I match on static data so that a
company is either always in the control or in the treatment group. I further test whether
the estimates are robust to disaggregated industries and hence match using 3 digit rather
than 2 digit industry codes. These changes to the rst stage matching procedure alter
the ATT estimates to a very small extent. The estimated size of the di¤erence between
ownership types varies between 12.53 and 13.42 percentage points.
There may be a concern about the e¤ect that overseas income may have had on taxable
prots of multinational companies. Since my sample includes only foreign multinational
subsidiaries without any subsidiaries themselves, foreign multinational subsidiaries in the
matched sample should have no subsidiaries which could be paying dividend income back
to the UK. However, 2.6 percent of foreign multinational subsidiaries in the matched
sample report to have some overseas income. This may be because I have no data on
their subsidiaries and hence I did not exclude them in the selection process, or because
their headquarters have paid dividends to their subsidiaries in the UK.
The concern is that overseas income as reported in the tax returns is calculated
before double tax relief. This means that part of that overseas income in not actually
liable to corporation tax and hence I may be overstating income of foreign multinational
subsidiaries by not accounting for the sheltered portion of that income. To understand
the e¤ect of overseas income on my results I exclude prots sheltered by double tax relief
from my taxable prots numbers (row 6 in Table 3).33 Alternatively, I use only years
before the 2009 dividend tax reform (row 5 in Table 3). The exclusion of overseas income
sheltered by double tax relief increases the ATT coe¢ cient slightly. Excluding later years
in the sample increases the size of the baseline coe¢ cient signicantly. I discuss the yearly
heterogeneity of the estimated coe¢ cients in section 4.4.
I exclude the ring-fenced prots from the taxable prots number to see whether my
results are driven by the North Sea oil rig companies reporting large taxable incomes.
In a similar spirit I exclude mining sector altogether, since companies from that sector
report incomparably high ratios of taxable prots to total assets.34 These exclusions do
33In the tax return form a company has to report the amount of double tax relief claimed, based on
the amount of its tax liability. I use the tax rate that applies to each company and multiply that by the
amount of double tax relief to obtain the amount of prots sheltered by double tax relief.
34For evidence of sectoral di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between ownership
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not change the results signicantly (rows 7 and 8 in Table 3).
I further exclude companies that report to have positive investments on their bal-
ance sheets as part of their xed assets number (row 9 in Table 3). This number is an
approximate for equity value of their subsidiaries. This e¤ectively excludes all compa-
nies that may have any subsidiaries, but which reported no information on this in the
ownership data and hence have not been excluded during the sample selection process;
29 percent of foreign multinational subsidiaries and 5 percent of domestic standalones
report data on investments in the FAME dataset. However, the exclusion of investments
from the total assets measure does not seem to a¤ect the main results; it changes the size
of the estimated di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign
multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones only marginally.
I then consider matching using only the sub-sample of companies that report no
trading losses to make sure that my estimates are not driven by companies reporting
trading losses (row 10 in Table 3). The ATT estimate is 12.28 percentage points, which
implies that foreign multinational subsidiaries report 40 percent lower ratio of taxable
prots to total assets than domestic standalones. This suggests that the baseline results
are indeed driven by zero taxable prot reporting foreign multinationals with no trading
losses.
Furthermore, I explore whether matching with replacement a¤ects my results and
whether utilizing more than one domestic standalone to match with foreign multina-
tional subsidiary makes a di¤erence (rows 11 and 12 in Table 3). As discussed in the
empirical methodology, using more observations as a control group increases the e¢ -
ciency of the estimates, but might a¤ect the bias of the coe¢ cient. Using matching with
replacement I can use the same large domestic standalone in the right hand side tail
of the company size distribution several times, if it is the best match for a particular
foreign multinational subsidiary. Therefore it is conceivable that I am using more com-
parable domestic standalones in this approach. Using matching with replacement results
in the ATT increasing marginally to 13.17 percentage points. In turn, using 5-nearest
neighborhood matching, instead of 1-nearest neighborhood matching, decreases the size
of the estimated di¤erence to 9.98 percentage points35. However, using various matching
algorithms does not a¤ect the implied size of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones; it
remains around 50 percent.
Finally, I test how di¤erent is the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between for-
eign multinational subsidiaries and domestic group subsidiaries using the same matching
approach as in the case of domestic standalones. I nd that the gap in the ratio of tax-
types see Habu (2017).
355-nearest neighbourhood matching uses 5 closest comparable domestic standalones for each foreign
multinational subsidiary, instead of 1. The matching is still performed within the 0.1 predicted probability
radius.
20
able prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic group
subsidiaries is just over a third of what it is between foreign multinational subsidiaries
and domestic standalones; the ATT is -4.82 percentage points. This implies that foreign
multinational subsidiaries report almost 30 percent lower ratio of taxable prots to total
assets relative to domestic groups. This is 20 percentage points lower than their implied
taxable prots di¤erence relative to domestic standalones.
This is to be expected for two reasons. As I have already discussed, I am not certain
whether some of the domestic groups subsidiaries are not part of the foreign multina-
tional category. This introduces downward bias into the size of the estimated di¤erence.
Secondly, domestic groups have been shown to have as high leverage as foreign multina-
tionals and since leverage can be used to shelter taxable prots, we would expect their
taxable prots to be more comparable. However, foreign multinational subsidiaries can
shift prots abroad while domestic group subsidiaries (if identied correctly into that
ownership category) cannot. Therefore we may expect the di¤erences in the ratio of tax-
able prots to total assets between domestic group subsidiaries and foreign multinational
subsidiaries to signify, among other factors, the di¤erences in prot shifting ability. In
turn, the di¤erence between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones
signies a broader set of tax avoidance opportunities available to groups of companies.
In the second part of Table 3 I explore various company size measures which could be
used as alternatives to total assets in the rst stage of propensity score matching. I use
number of employees, xed assets and trading turnover. For each of the size variables,
I perform PSM twice; rst, matching on this alternative size variable and second, com-
paring the results to matching on total assets on the limited sample of observations for
which I have data on each of those alternative size variables. This allows me to examine
whether various matching alternatives change the inference in terms of the size of the gap
in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries
and domestic standalones.
I nd that matching on the number of employees, xed assets or trading turnover
instead of total assets increases the estimated size of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable
prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic stand-
alones twofold (see Panel B, Table 3). Most of the di¤erence comes from the much higher
ratio of taxable prots to total assets for domestic standalones. Foreign multinational
subsidiaries in my sample often have a large proportion of their total assets held in intan-
gible assets, while domestic standalones do not have the same proportion of intangible
assets. Therefore, for instance, when matching only on xed assets (rows 3 and 4 in
Table 3), a multinational with large intangible assets that was previously a match for a
domestic standalone, with no intangible assets will now be matched with much smaller
domestic standalone company. As we have seen in Table 2 smaller domestic standalones
tend to report higher ratios of taxable prots to total assets. This explains why the ratio
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of taxable prots to total assets in the control group is much higher when matching on
xed assets. In case of matching on trading turnover this indicates that domestic stand-
alones, which have similar trading turnover to foreign multinational subsidiaries, report
higher taxable prots to total assets ratio than domestic standalones with similar total
assets.
Further, I explore what happens when instead of having the ratios of taxable prots to
total assets as an outcome variables, I perform the baseline matching analysis with trading
prots to trading turnover as an outcome variable.36 The mean ratio of trading prots
to trading turnover for foreign multinational subsidiaries is lower than that for taxable
prots to total assets. Since a large proportion of foreign multinational subsidiaries
taxable income comes from sources other than trading prots, we would expect the size
of the di¤erence estimated here to be much smaller than the one for the ratio of taxable
prots to total assets. This seems to be the case, as the ATT estimate is -6.2 percentage
points; foreign multinational subsidiaries report 41 percent lower ratio of trading prots
to trading turnover than domestic standalones.
Finally, multinational companies can have multiple subsidiaries in the UK and can
choose to locate their taxable prots in one of those subsidiaries and report zero taxable
prots in their remaining a¢ liates. This would be a concern especially because a large
number of foreign multinational subsidiaries in the UK indeed report zero taxable prots.
A direct way to deal with this concern would be to aggregate data on UK groups of
companies. However, the issues of double counting of total assets arise if one company
in the group owns another. Since, the ownership data does not have full coverage of all
ownership links in the UK, hence, aggregating companies into groups would introduce a
measurement error.
Alternatively, to alleviate those concerns I perform two additional tests. First, I do
PSM on the sample of foreign multinational subsidiaries, which reported to have only
one subsidiary in the UK. The results are similar to the ones using the whole sample
of foreign multinational subsidiaries. Foreign multinational subsidiaries report about 50
percent lower ratio of taxable prots to total assets than domestic standalones. Again, the
di¤erence between the two ownership types in entirely driven by the zero taxable prot
reporting foreign multinational subsidiaries. Second, I calculate the weighted means of
taxable prots relative to total assets for both ownership types on the PSM matched
36Scaling trading prots by trading turnover is an alternative measure to compare taxable prots of
the two chosen ownership types. HMRC data has information on trading turnover of companies, which is
the total value of sales of a company which arise from its trading activities. Since trading turnover only
covers information on trading activities of companies, for consistency purposes the taxable prot measure
used when scaling by trading turnover should only include prots from trading activities, i.e. trading
prots. However, a substantial fraction of taxable prots of multinational companies (over 30 percent)
comes from outside trading activities, such as overseas income, interest on loans, capital gains. This
is not the case for domestic standalones which derive almost all of their prots from trading activities.
Therefore using this measure would disproportionately bias downwards the ratio of taxable prots to
size for multinational companies.
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sample. The feature of the weighted mean is that it sums the observations for the de-
nominator and the numerator. In a way, this will account for the presence of multiple
subsidiaries of the same company in the UK. I nd that the weighted ratio of taxable
prots to total assets for foreign multinational subsidiaries in the matched sample is 10.8
percent, while it is 5.4 percent for domestic standalones. Hence, foreign multinational
subsidiaries report 50 percent lower weighted ratio of taxable prots to total assets. This
conrms that the baseline results is not driven by multiple subsidiaries of the same com-
pany reporting zero taxable prots.
4.2 Channels companies use to lower their taxable prots
In this section I explore potential factors driving the wedge in the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones. For
each potential channel that a company may be using to reduce its taxable prots, I use
that channel as an outcome variable in the baseline propensity score matching to explore
direct di¤erences between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones.
In addition, I run a PSM using that factor as an additional matching variable and then
perform baseline matching on the sample of observations for which I have data on this
additional matching factor. That allows me to estimate whether the change in the ATT
estimate is due to the sample composition or whether the variable itself a¤ects the size of
the estimate. In this section I consider ow measure of gearing, stock measure of gearing
- leverage, capital allowances and total factor productivity.
In Table 4 I show results in groups of three, for each potential channel that companies
could use to reduce their taxable prots. For instance, in case of leverage, I rst present
results frommatching on leverage and total assets, then frommatching on total assets only
with the ratio of taxable prots to total assets as an outcome variable and nally matching
on total assets only with leverage as outcome variable; the latter two are performed using
a sample of observations for which I have leverage data.
First, I consider the amount of debt that foreign multinational subsidiaries can take
on. I look at both stock and ow measures of gearing, where stock measure is leverage,
i.e. total liabilities divided by total assets, while ow measure is net interest divided
by prot and loss before interest. First, I use leverage as an outcome variable in PSM
and I nd that foreign multinational subsidiaries take on about 14.1 percentage points
more debt than comparable domestic standalones. Further, to estimate the importance
of leverage, I run PSM using debt as an additional matching variable. I nd leverage
to be an important factor. The ATT from matching on leverage and total assets is -
2.67 percentage points which is about 40 percent of what it is when matching on total
assets only on the sample of observations with non-missing data on leverage (ATT of
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-4.21 percentage points)37. This would suggest that leverage explains 40 percent of the
di¤erence in taxable prots to total assets ratio between foreign multinational subsidiaries
and domestic standalones.38 ;39 This could suggest use of more debt shifting among UK
subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies. However, it may also be that companies
want to locate their debt in the UK due to highly advantageous tax system (low interest,
CFC rules, etc.).
The other - unexplained - portion of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones may
be attributed to other prot shifting strategies, such as transfer pricing and royalties
licensing. I am unable to investigate this further since the e¤ects of both transfer pricing
and royalties licensing are already incorporated in the taxable prots (or trading losses)
gure reported by foreign multinational subsidiaries on their tax income statements.
I further explore the results from matching on the ratio of capital allowances to total
assets (rows 10 and 11 in Table 4) and TFP (rows 7-9 in Table 4). The di¤erence
in the ratio of capital allowances to total assets between the two ownership types in
insignicant and matching on capital allowances in addition to total assets does not
alter the estimates of the di¤erence in the ratios of taxable prots to total assets between
foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones relative to baseline estimates.
I nd that foreign multinational subsidiaries report to have signicantly higher pro-
ductivity than domestic standalones. Moreover, when matching on TFP, the size of the
di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between the two analyzed ownership
types falls from -0.56 to -0.42.40 Foreign multinational subsidiaries are more productive
than domestic standalones, yet conditional on having similar productivity levels they re-
port lower taxable prots to total assets ratio than domestic standalones. This suggests
that around 25 percent of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets
between ownership types is explained by di¤erences in productivity between rms.
37This large reduction in the ATT estimates when matching on total assets on the sample on non-
missing leverage data arises mainly because I only have data on leverage for larger foreign multinational
subsidiaries and domestic standalones. These companies have lower ratios of taxable prots to total
assets than the ones in the full analyzed sample; see the heterogeneity analysis in Section 4.4.
38Note that this evidence stands in stark contrast to Buettner and Wamser (2013), who provide
evidence that debt shifting is unimportant for German a¢ liates.
39I nd that di¤erences in the ow measure of gearing do not alter the size of the baseline estimates.
40Again, when matching on TFP and total assets or on total assets on the sample of non-missing
TFP observations, I nd that the ratios of taxable prots to total assets for both ownership groups are
much lower than in the sample analyzed in the baseline matching. This is again because we only have
information on TFP for larger rms, which report lower ratios of taxable prots to total assets.
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4.3 Comparison of taxable and accounting prots
Most of the previous literature on prot shifting uses accounting prots to proxy for
taxable prots. Since taxable prots are censored at zero, while accounting prots can
take negative values, to compare taxable and accounting prots directly the literature
tends to use two distinct approaches. The rst method takes trading losses from the tax
return form and subtracts them from taxable prots to recover the negative portion of
taxable prots and obtain a measure which is closer to the current taxable prots. The
second method converts all negative accounting prots into zeros, e¤ectively censoring
them in the same way as taxable prots are censored in the tax returns. The accounting
dataset - FAME - includes variables related to taxable prots, namely gross operating
prots less depreciation and prot and loss before taxes. In Figure 2 I compare the
positive taxable and accounting prots by plotting the distributions of logarithms of 3
di¤erent measures of prots.
Accounting prots as measured by prot and loss before tax or by operating prots
less depreciation overestimate the taxable prots reported by foreign multinational sub-
sidiaries (Panel A, Figure 2). The distribution of positive accounting prots is shifted
to the right relative to the distribution of positive taxable prots. However, account-
ing prots seem to be a better approximation of taxable prots of domestic standalones
(Panel B, Figure 2).41 Accounting depreciation is smaller than tax depreciation, which is
one of the reasons why we would expect accounting prots less accounting depreciation
to be larger than trading prots, but to the same extent for both ownership types.
The PSM estimates suggest that the main di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to
total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones lies in
the di¤erences of the number of observations reporting zero taxable prots. Therefore I
also compare the distributions of taxable prots minus trading loss scaled by total assets
relative to prot and loss before taxes scaled by total assets around zero (method 1).
Figure 3 contains 4 panels where each panel plots distributions of the ratios of prots
to total assets; the left hand side panels (A and B) refer to comparisons of accounting
and taxable prots, the right hand side panels (C and D) compare foreign multinational
subsidiaries with domestic standalones. The horizontal axis in those gures shows the
ratios of prots to total assets, while on vertical axis we have kernel density estimate,
which shows the density of observations at each particular value of the ratio of prots to
total assets.
Bunching around zero prots in prevalent in both accounting data (as shown by
Johannesen et al. (2016)) as well as tax returns. What is more interesting is that bunching
around zero is much larger for taxable prots relative to accounting prots for foreign
multinational subsidiaries than for domestic standalones (see LHS gures, Figure 3). In
41Interest and royalty payments both are deducted at the operating prot levels already.
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addition, foreign multinational subsidiaries bunch around zero taxable prots to a larger
extent than domestic standalones (Panel C). However, there is no di¤erence in bunching
around zero accounting prots between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic
standalones (Panel D).42
Furthermore, zero taxable prot reporting companies appear to come from the miss-
ing mass to the right of the taxable prots distribution, where the accounting prots
distribution indicates that companies report much higher ratio of accounting prots to
total assets. This suggests that accounting prots may overestimate taxable prots, es-
pecially in case of foreign multinational subsidiaries. Therefore I consider comparisons
of PSM results using ratios of accounting and taxable prots to total assets as outcome
variables, using the two methods described above.
In Table 5, using the rst method I nd that the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prof-
its to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones
is estimated to be -14.7 percentage points (row 3), while the di¤erence in the ratio of
accounting prots to total assets on the same sample is -7.0 percentage points (row 4).
Using the second method, I nd the di¤erence in taxable prots between the two owner-
ship types to be -5.9 percentage points (row 1), while the di¤erence in accounting prots
is -2.7 percentage points (row 2). In both cases the estimates of the di¤erence in the
ratio of prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic
standalones are substantially smaller when using accounting prots data than using tax-
able prots data. What is more, the ratios of taxable prots to total assets for foreign
multinational subsidiaries are generally smaller than the ratios of accounting prots to
total assets for both methods. This suggests that the previous estimates of prot shifting
obtained using accounting data might be underestimating the true size of prot shifting
of foreign multinational companies. Since the PSM results are driven by the zero taxable
prot reporting companies, this is not at all surprising. Foreign multinational subsidiaries
seem to be reporting positive prots in their accounts, while at the same time reporting
zero taxable prots on their tax returns. This would bias the estimates of prot shifting
obtained using accounting data downwards.
Finally, the last row in Table 5 considers di¤erences in the e¤ective tax rates between
foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones. The e¤ective tax rates are
calculated as ratios of tax liability from tax returns to accounting prots measure (prot
and loss before taxes). I nd that foreign multinational subsidiaries report lower e¤ective
tax rates in the UK than comparable domestic standalones. A more rigorous comparison
of taxable and accounting data is outside the scope of this paper. Using tax returns
data instead of accounting data to understand the reporting behaviour of multinational
companies is an interesting avenue for further research.
42For additional evidence on the discrepancies between tax and accounting prots see Devereux et al.
(2015) and Ma¢ ni et al. (2016).
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Figure 2: Distribution of prots. Comparison between tax and accounting measures.
Panel A: Foreign multinational subsidiaries 
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Note: Distribution of logarithm of prots, comparison between FAME and CT600
using the sample of matched companies. The propensity score matching was per-
formed using total assets and within industry, 2000 - 2011. Accounting prots refer
to prot and loss before tax, accounting prots type 2 refer to operating prots
less deductions, taxable prots measure comes from the tax return form. Source:
merged HMRC and FAME data.
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4.4 Heterogeneity of the estimated coe¢ cients
In this section I explore the heterogeneity of the baseline estimates of the di¤erence in
the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and
domestic standalones. I specically focus on three aspects of heterogeneity; rst, I discuss
di¤erences in the ATT estimates as the size of companies increases, then I focus on the
yearly variation in the estimated coe¢ cients and nally on the di¤erences between foreign
multinational subsidiaries depending on the location of their headquarters. The analysis
of the latter two heterogeneities is aimed at linking the estimated di¤erence in the ratio
of taxable prots to total assets between ownership types to prot shifting.
First, I focus on estimating the di¤erences in the ATT by size bins. I divide the sample
of foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones into 10 equally-sized size
bins based on total assets. Within each bin, I perform propensity score matching using
total assets, within each industry. This gives me 20 di¤erent ratios of taxable prots to
total assets, 10 for foreign multinational subsidiaries in each size bin and 10 for comparable
domestic standalones in each of those size bins.
The results in Table 6 suggest that the size of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable
prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones
declines as companies get larger, the only exception being the very smallest companies
in size bin 1. Further, the ratios of taxable prots to total assets for both ownership
categories fall as well. Hence, the implied size of the gap in the ratio of taxable prots to
total assets between the two analyzed ownership types decreases as well. However, the
implied gap in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational
subsidiaries and domestic standalones only signicantly changes once companies are much
larger than median in my sample.
The UK has introduced several corporate tax rate cuts starting in 2008. For a company
for which the marginal cost of shifting its taxable prots out of the UK is equal to the
marginal benet, we would expect that a cut in the domestic corporate tax rate may
induce subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies to report more taxable prots in
the UK, if the tax rates in other countries in which they have a¢ liates remained the same.
This is because the marginal cost of reporting lower taxable prots in the UK increases
following the domestic corporate tax rate cut.
However, it may well be that foreign multinational subsidiaries do not respond to the
UK corporate tax rate cuts, because the benet they accrue from reducing their taxable
prots in the UK is not a convex function of their prots. Instead, they have xed cost of
shifting prots. Large companies with elaborate prot shifting strategies in place may be
inelastic to changes in the tax rates, in so far as they already report zero taxable prots.
The reduced tax rate would not o¤er them incentive high enough to exceed the xed cost
of switching to a di¤erent tax planning strategy to report higher (or even positive) taxable
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prots in the UK. This is consistent with a large and continuously increasing fraction of
foreign multinational subsidiaries that report zero taxable prots in the UK. Of course, it
may be that in more recent years, the reputational gain from reporting positive taxable
prots may be of importance, especially in the context of a recent increase in naming and
shaming of the largest companies (Google, Amazon, Starbucks). This may incentivize
companies to report more taxable prots in the UK. However, this is likely to be outside
of my analysis period, which ends in 2011.
Using the UK corporate tax rate cuts as a quasi-natural experiment and comparing
taxable prots of foreign multinational subsidiaries to the ones of domestic standalones
before and after the rate cut would help in linking the di¤erences in the ratio of taxable
prots to total assets with tax rate di¤erentials. The previous literature on prot shifting
has shown a very strong relationship in tax rate di¤erentials between countries and the
amount of prots reported in those countries.
The corporate tax rate cuts, together with the continuous e¤ort of the tax revenue
authorities to reduce prot shifting activities of multinational companies, mean that the
question arises whether the size of the estimated di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones has
decreased accordingly. To answer this question, I estimate the PSM for each sample
year separately and calculate the ATT for the ratio of taxable prots to total assets for
each of the years 2000 - 2011. I then plot those ATT estimates alongside the condence
intervals in Figure 4. In addition to the ratio of taxable prots to total assets, I also plot
the ATT estimates of the di¤erences in the proportions of zero taxable prots between
foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones.
I nd that the size of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets
between the two ownership types has increased from -5.1 percentage points in 2000 to
-20.6 percentage points in 2011 with some uctuations around the nancial crisis. This
increase can possibly be attributed to a constantly increasing di¤erence in the fraction
of zero taxable prot reporting companies. This has increased from 26 percentage points
in 2000 to 37 percentage points in 2011. All of the yearly ATT estimates are signicant.
This conrms the hypothesis of xed costs of prot shifting, as the size of the di¤erence
in taxable prots between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones
did not react to corporate tax rate cuts in the UK.
Finally, I explore di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets reported
by foreign multinational subsidiaries depending on where their headquarters are located.
This o¤ers an alternative identication strategy to link the estimated size of the di¤erence
in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between ownership types to prot shifting.
There is some evidence in the literature that companies with a¢ liates in tax havens tend
to report lower accounting prots, which is often interpreted as sign of prot shifting
(Desai et al. (2006), Slemrod and Wilson (2009), Grubert and Slemrod (1998), Hines and
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Rice (1994)). Should that be the case, we would expect foreign multinational subsidiaries
with parents in tax havens to be reporting lower ratios of taxable prots to total assets
in the UK than foreign multinational subsidiaries with parents in higher tax countries.
What is more, media has been pointing towards the US headquartered companies, such
as recently named and shamedGoogle, Amazon, Apple or Starbucks as those which
tend to pay very little tax in the UK.43 I explore both of those claims below.
To estimate the di¤erences in the ratios of taxable prots to total assets between for-
eign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones depending on where the multi-
national headquarters are located I perform PSM. I divide the sample of foreign multina-
tional subsidiaries according to the location of their global ultimate owner. I then perform
PSM separately for each of those sub-groups of foreign multinational subsidiaries nd-
ing the nearest neighborhood match among all domestic standalones. I use the whole
population of domestic standalones for each of the sub-groups of foreign multinational
subsidiaries with various headquarter locations, hence the same domestic standalone can
be used in each sub-sample. I distinguish between the following headquarter locations:
tax haven (excluding large tax havens), large tax haven such as Hong Kong, Singapore,
Netherlands and Ireland, French multinationals, German multinationals, other European
multinationals, US multinationals, Asian multinationals, other foreign multinationals.
The results from this matching procedure are presented in Table 7 and are ranked
according to the size of the estimated di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total
assets, from largest to smallest. The number of foreign multinational subsidiaries head-
quartered in each of the country groups are reported in the observation treated column.
I nd that foreign multinational subsidiaries headquartered in tax havens report much
lower ratios of taxable prots to total assets in the UK relative to domestic standalones
(the size of the di¤erence is -16.95 percentage points). They are followed by foreign
multinational subsidiaries headquartered in large tax havens. The smallest di¤erence to
domestic standalones, by far, is reported by other foreign multinationals (-3.34 percent-
age points). US headquartered companies do not report particularly low ratios of taxable
prots to total assets in the UK relative to companies headquartered in other countries.
This is especially interesting, considering that most of the very large multinational com-
panies accused of prot shifting in the media are the ones headquartered in the US (e.g.
Starbucks or Amazon). Further, subsidiaries of multinationals headquartered in other
European countries (apart from France, Germany, Netherlands and Ireland) tend to re-
port very similar ratios of taxable prots to total assets relative to domestic standalones
in the UK.44
43See articles in e.g. BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20560359), which talk about very
large companies avoiding tax in the UK.
44I can alternatively compute the weighted mean ratios of taxable prots to total assets for each of
the headquarter location groups to see which foreign multinational subsidiaries report lowest ratios of
taxable prots to total assets. In Figure 5 in the Appendix I show that foreign multinationals located in
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Figure 4: PSM - yearly heterogeneity.
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large tax havens tend to report lowest ratios of taxable prots to total assets in the UK.
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5 Conclusion
This paper uses the administrative corporate tax returns data to show that foreign multi-
national companies report lower ratios of taxable prots to total assets than comparable
domestic standalone companies. The propensity score matching approach controls for the
di¤erences between the two groups coming from size and industry variation, and estimates
the remainder of the di¤erence to be 12.76 percentage points. Assuming that similar sized
companies from similar industries should be reporting similar taxable prots, unless they
are involved in practices that aim at minimizing their tax liability in the UK, the di¤er-
ence estimated in this paper suggests that foreign multinational subsidiaries shift a large
proportion of their taxable prots out of the UK. Specically, the baseline propensity
score estimates suggest that foreign multinational subsidiaries underreport their taxable
prots by about 50% relative to domestic standalones. This is the rst study of that type
which measures the size of the potential prot shifting of the UK companies.
Using the net tax payable from the tax returns together with the implied estimates
of the size of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets, I can calculate
the implied revenue gain from equalizing the taxable prots of domestic standalones and
foreign multinationals. From the yearly PSM estimates, we know that the size of the gap
in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets varies between 30 and 70 percent. Back of
the envelope calculations show that the potential revenue gains from equalizing the tax
payments of foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones would vary from
£ 3 billion pounds at the beginning of the sample to £ 25 billion in 2011. Relative to the
total UK corporate tax revenue, which was £ 30 billion in 2000 and £ 35 billion in 2011,
this would imply that a full elimination of the di¤erences in the taxable prots between
domestic standalones and foreign multinational subsidiaries would lead to revenue gains
of 10 percent in 2000 and 70 percent in 2011.45 In the context of the recent proposals to
reform the corporate tax system by introducing the destination base cash ow tax in the
US, these welfare gain calculations could help understand the benets of equalizing the
tax treatment of foreign and domestic companies. This is because destination base cash
ow tax aims at elimination of the current channels of prot shifting and equalization of
the tax treatment of foreign and domestic companies.
According to the propensity score matching estimates almost all of the estimated dif-
ference in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between domestic standalones and
foreign multinationals can be attributed to the large fraction of zero taxable prot re-
porting companies amongst foreign multinationals. Once multinational companies report
positive taxable prots, their reporting behaviour does not di¤er substantially from that
of domestic standalones. This suggests that most of the prot shifting is actually quite
45These calculations do not take into account possible behavioural changes that are likely to occur if
such an equalization was possible.
38
aggressive and occurs via reporting zero taxable prots.
These ndings also have implications for theoretical modeling of prot shifting costs.
If zero taxable prots are prevalent and they explain most of the di¤erence in the taxable
prot reporting behavior between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic stand-
alones, then the assumption of xed costs will be preferred to the previously assumed
convex marginal costs of prot shifting. This means that rms may be less responsive to
marginal tax rate changes than previously thought, as they bear a xed cost of shifting
prots and once they are large enough to incur that, they report no taxable prots. This
may explain why the recent work using rm level data does not nd large e¤ects of tax
rate changes on prots reported by rms. In contrast, majority of the previous literature
that used aggregate data has found large responses. These large aggregate responses
may come from rms near the xed cost of prot shifting kink switching in and out of
reporting positive taxable prots in response to tax changes. These may be thought of
as extensive margin responses.
I further nd that the previous estimates of prot shifting based on accounting data
might be underestimating the true size of the problem. The extent of zero taxable prot
reporting is much larger than near-zero accounting prot reporting for foreign multina-
tional subsidiaries, but not for domestic standalones. Further work in this area is required
to shed more light on the di¤erences between the estimates of the ratio of prots to total
assets using accounting and taxable prots.
I also estimate that about 40 percent of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to
total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones in the
matched sample comes from the di¤erences in leverage between ownership types. Since
di¤erence in leverage suggests a presence of debt shifting, this could mean that up to 40
percent of foreign multinational prot shifting may be explained by debt shifting.
Finally, the estimate of the size of prot shifting presented in this paper is likely
to be an underestimate of the true size of prot shifting of all foreign multinational
subsidiaries. This is because the propensity score matching leads to an exclusion of the
very large foreign multinational subsidiaries (since no comparable domestic standalones
exist) that report much lower ratios of taxable prots to total assets than the smaller
foreign multinational subsidiaries in the matched sample. Specically, the unweighted
ratio of taxable prots to total assets is 5.6 percent for the very large, unmatched foreign
multinational subsidiaries, less than half of the ratio for foreign multinational subsidiaries
in the propensity score matched sample. This is inevitably more speculative since we do
not have large enough domestic standalones to compare them to the largest multinationals
and hence we are unable to say whether larger domestic standalones would have also
reported lower taxable prots as a fraction of their size.
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6 Appendices
Table 8: Rosenbaum sensitivity tests.
Rosenbaum	bounds	for	delta	(N	=	260617	matched	pairs)	 	
Gamma	 sig+	 sig-	 t-hat+	 t-hat-	 CI+	 CI-	
1	 0	 0	 -0.06688	 -0.06688	 -0.06763	 -0.06614	
1.2	 0	 0	 -0.08267	 -0.05234	 -0.08347	 -0.05167	
1.4	 0	 0	 -0.09685	 -0.04102	 -0.09772	 -0.04037	
1.6	 0	 0	 -0.10994	 -0.03187	 -0.11087	 -0.03128	
1.8	 0	 0	 -0.12219	 -0.02433	 -0.12319	 -0.02376	
2	 0	 0	 -0.1336	 -0.01798	 -0.13465	 -0.01741	
2.2	 0	 0	 -0.14439	 -0.0125	 -0.14551	 -0.01195	
2.4	 0	 0	 -0.15467	 -0.00771	 -0.15585	 -0.00719	
2.6	 0	 0	 -0.16451	 -0.00356	 -0.16575	 -0.00307	
2.8	 0	 0	 -0.17392	 -0.00023	 -0.17522	 -1.6E-05	
3	 0	 0.010836	 -0.18295	 -4.30E-07	 -0.18432	 -4.30E-07	
*	gamma		-	log	odds	of	differential	assignment	due	to	unobserved	factors	
sig+			-	upper	bound	significance	level	 	 	 	
sig-			-	lower	bound	significance	level	 	 	 	
t-hat+	-	upper	bound	Hodges-Lehmann	point	estimate	 	
t-hat-	-	lower	bound	Hodges-Lehmann	point	estimate	 	
CI+				-	upper	bound	confidence	interval	(a=		.95)	 	 	
CI-				-	lower	bound	confidence	interval	(a=		.95)	 	 		
Note: Results from the Rosenbaum sensitivity tests for unobserved factors
a¤ecting the PSM estimates. In this table I test the baseline specication.
Selected sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
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Figure 5: Taxable prots by headquarter location.
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sidiaries of foreign multinational companies in the UK by global ultimate owner
of the multinational group. Selected sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: merged
HMRC and FAME data.
6.1 Regression analysis
The propensity score matching results can be directly compared to the OLS estimates.
The di¤erence in the unconditional means of the ratios of taxable prots to total assets
between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones can be estimated
using an OLS regression of taxable prots scaled by total assets on the left hand side on
a multinational dummy and further control variables on the right hand side:
yit = + 1multinationali + Xit + indi + yeart + uit (3)
In these regressions the main variable of interest is multinationali, which is a time-
invariant dummy equal to one if the company is a foreign multinational subsidiary and
0 if it is a domestic standalone. With the dependant variable, yit; being the ratio of
taxable prots to total assets for rm i in year t, the coe¢ cient 1 on the multinational
dummy is the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between domestic
standalones and foreign multinational subsidiaries. The vector Xit controls for rm level
observable characteristics (total assets in the baseline specication), indi and yeart are
year and industry xed e¤ects. The constant is the mean ratio of taxable prots to total
assets for domestic standalones.
The coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy in a regression without any controls
estimates the upper bound of the total size of the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prof-
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its to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones.
Inclusion of xed e¤ects and further controls will attribute parts of that di¤erence to
observable rm and industry level characteristics. Including exible form of industry and
size variables into the estimation, i.e. controlling for size and industry in the full sample
would bring the coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy closer to the PSM estimates of
the di¤erence. When we restrict the sample on which such an OLS regression is run
to propensity score matched sample and use multinational dummy as the only explana-
tory variable, the coe¢ cient on that multinational dummy will be equivalent to the ATT
estimated by the PSM.
Similar to PSM, we can utilize the decomposition of the unconditional mean into
conditional one and the binary outcome. Therefore I estimate the OLS regression on the
sample of positive taxable prots only using both full and propensity score matched sam-
ples. I also estimate a binary regression model for the likelihood of reporting zero taxable
prots depending on the ownership status. Hence, I estimate the following equation:
dit = + '1multinationali + 'Xit + indi + yeart + it: (4)
where dit is a dummy equal to 1 when a company reports taxable prots to be zero
and zero otherwise and other variables are dened as in equation 3. I estimate this
binary model using linear probability model (OLS) and maximum likelihood estimate
(probit). Further, I include leverage and other potential determinants of reporting zero
taxable prots, such as rm structure and previous years losses (see Table 9 for the
list of variables). This estimation is designed to understand what determines the zero
taxable prot reporting behaviour of companies. One could also interact the explanatory
variables with the multinational dummy to understand the di¤erences in zero taxable
prots determinants between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalone
companies.46
6.1.1 Results from OLS and LDV specications
In this section I present the results from the unconditional (Table 10) and conditional
(Table 11) OLS estimations of the mean di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total
assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones as well as
limited dependant variable estimations of the determinants of zero taxable prot reporting
(Table 12).
The results from the OLS estimates (Table 10) on the unrestricted sample of foreign
multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones suggest a very large di¤erence be-
46For more detailed analysis of the loss making behaviour of UK companies please see Arulampalam,
Guceri and Devereux (2017).
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tween the two ownership types in terms of the ratio of taxable prots to total assets. The
coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy in these regressions estimates the upper bound of
the di¤erence in taxable prots between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic
standalones; this is 52.3 percentage points (column 1). The mean ratio of taxable prots
to total assets for domestic standalones in 0.617. This means that foreign multinational
subsidiaries report almost 90 percent lower ratio of taxable prots to total assets than
domestic standalones.
This large di¤erence is partially explained by industry xed e¤ects (column 2) and
size di¤erences (column 3). Similar to the propensity score matching estimates, about
40 percent of the di¤erence between the analyzed ownership types is explained by di¤er-
ences in leverage (column 4), where the coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy decreases
substantially. Inclusion of total factor productivity (column 5) halves the coe¢ cient on
the multinational dummy, but this is primary due to sample composition. Controlling
for the ratio of capital allowances to total assets (column 6) does not change the size of
the coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy.
In columns 7 - 10 instead of including a linear function of size, I include size bins, which
is more similar to what propensity score matching does. It turns out that controlling for
size bins the coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy declines substantially (column 7).
Further, since the mean ratio of taxable prots to total assets in each size bin is lower as
companies get larger, this suggests that larger multinationals report lower taxable prots
than the ones for which we can nd comparable domestic standalones. Inclusion of
leverage (column 8) and TFP reduce the coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy further
while capital allowances do not change it. In column 11 I provide the results from
running OLS without any controls on the PSM matched sample. The coe¢ cient on the
multinational dummy is identical to the PSM estimate and is included for comparison
purpose. The constant from that OLS regression is the mean ratio of taxable prots to
total assets for domestic standalones and is equivalent to the one estimated using the
PSM approach.
Limiting the sample to positive taxable prots (Table 11) the results looks very similar
to the ones from Table 10 using the full sample of taxable prots. This suggests that in the
restricted sample of positive taxable prots, the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones exists
and it is only when we use bins of total assets to control for size di¤erences (column 7-10)
that it disappears. The coe¢ cients on the multinational dummy become insignicant and
get smaller in columns 7-10 and including further controls for leverage, TFP and capital
allowances reduces the coe¢ cient to be almost zero and insignicant.
In Table 12 I present results from estimating the limited dependant variable model
using OLS (the results using probit models are not signicantly di¤erent).47 The coef-
47Running the LDV models on the PSM sample generates very similar results.
46
cient on the multinational dummy estimates how much more likely it is for a foreign
multinational subsidiary to report zero taxable prots relative to a domestic standalone.
In all cases the coe¢ cient of interest is positive and signicant implying that foreign
multinational subsidiaries report taxable prots to be zero signicantly more often than
domestic standalone companies.
Table 9: Denitions of control variables used in LDV and in Heckman estimations.
variable	 definition	
liabilities_ta	 total	liabilities	divided	by	total	assets	
ztp2yrs	 zero	taxable	profits	reported	in	at	least	last	2	out	of	3	years;	dummy	1	or	0	
previous_losses_ta	 dummy	1	if	company	has	brought	in	forward	losses	from	previous	year	to	
claim	against	taxable	profits	this	year	
guo_stattau	 statutory	tax	rate	in	the	country	of	global	ultimate	owner	
lastyr_loss	 dummy	1	if	company	reported	zero	taxable	profits	last	year	
tax_haven	 dummy	1	if	the	global	ultimate	owner	is	located	in	tax	haven	
Ln_trading_turnover	 logarithm	of	trading	turnover	(box	1)	from	CT600	data		
These results in columns 2 - 9 explore potential factors that could be determining
the likelihood of reporting zero taxable prots. Table 9 denes each of the variables
used. I nd that higher leverage, bringing losses forward from the previous periods,
reporting taxable prots to be zero in at least last 2 out of 3 years, reporting zero taxable
prots in the previous year and a parent company located in a tax haven increase the
likelihood of reporting zero taxable prots. What is more, the higher the tax rate in the
parent company and the higher the companys own trading turnover, the less likely a
company is to report zero taxable prots in the UK. When I test the relative signicance
of these factors against each other (column 9), only the coe¢ cients on previous years
losses and previous years zero taxable prot reporting remain signicant, which would
suggest that persistency in reporting zero taxable prots is more important than any
observable rm level characteristics. The evidence on leverage and tax haven parent are
broadly consistent with the heterogeneities showed in the PSM results. They conrm
that both leverage and the presence of tax haven parents a¤ect the zero taxable prot
reporting behaviour of companies as well.48
What is more, for the binary part, the di¤erence between the matched (smaller) for-
48I can interact each explanatory variable with the multinational dummy to see whether their e¤ects
di¤er depending on which ownership category the company belongs to. The results show that there are
di¤erences in the magnitudes of determinants of zero taxable prots between ownership categories, but
each of the variables disucssed in Table 2.12 is signicant for both of the ownership groups.
47
eign multinational subsidiaries and the matched (larger) domestic standalones companies
is very similar to the di¤erence between all foreign multinational subsidiaries and all do-
mestic standalones (PSM matching coe¢ cient was 31.7 vs 31.6 in column 1 Table 12).
For the ratio of taxable prots to total assets, the di¤erence between the matched sub-
samples is much smaller than the di¤erence in the full sample (Table 10 column 1 vs 11).
This suggests that the di¤erences in the propensity to report zero taxable prots are not
very important in explaining the di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets
between matched (smaller) foreign multinational subsidiaries and unmatched (larger) for-
eign multinational subsidiaries and between matched (larger) domestic standalones and
unmatched (smaller) domestic standalones.
48
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6.2 Selection Models
The results from the propensity score matching have revealed that the explanation for
the di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between matched foreign
multinational subsidiaries and matched domestic standalones lies in the binary part of
the distribution. The fact that the coe¢ cient on the multinational dummy from the
binary regressions is signicant suggests that the estimate of the mean di¤erence in the
ratio of taxable prots to total assets between foreign multinational subsidiaries and
domestic standalones from a simple OLS regression may be inconsistent and downward
biased. There seems to be selection of companies into zero and positive taxable prot
reporting groups, which suggests that the more appropriate model to be estimated is a
selection type, such as Heckman selection model, which takes into account the bounded
nature of the data. This type of model will allow me to disentangle the importance
of the extensive and intensive margins for taxable prot reporting di¤erences between
ownership types. There are two choices here, either a simple censored regression model,
such as Tobit (Tobin (1956)), or a more sophisticated selection model, such as Heckman
(Heckman (1974), Heckman (1976)).
Tobit models assume that there is an unobservable latent variable yit, which linearly
depends on Xit via a parameter . In addition, there is a normally distributed error term
uit. The observable variable yit, in my case the ratio of taxable prots to total assets, is
dened to be equal to the latent variable whenever the latent variable is above zero and
zero otherwise.
yit = fy

it if y

it > 0
0 if yit  0
(5)
where yit is dened as :
yit = + 1multinationali + Xit + indi + yeart + uit: (6)
This is the same equation as the one estimated for the OLS model explaining the
di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between companies. A company
can choose to report zero or positive taxable prots, the choice of which is determined
by their protability as well as, for example, their propensity to aggressively avoid tax.
In case of Tobit models the latent variable absorbs both the process of reporting positive
versus zero taxable prots and the outcomeof interest. Therefore both processes are
determined by the same parameters. For a continuous variable from the vector Xit the
partial e¤ects of that variable in the zero taxable prot reporting equation, P (yit > 0jx),
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and its e¤ect in the outcome equation E(yjx; y > 0) have the same sign. Therefore it
is impossible for an explanatory variable to have a positive e¤ect of the likelihood of
making positive taxable prots, but negative e¤ect on how much prots the company
makes in general. This is quite a large limitation of the Tobit approach and in case of
comparing the taxable prots of foreign multinational subsidiaries with those of domestic
standalones might be crucial. This is because the baseline OLS and Probit models suggest
that being a multinational has an e¤ect on both the binary (extensive) and continuous
(intensive) parts of the distribution. As such, it seems to be of primary importance to
understand which margin of response drives the di¤erence in taxable prots between the
two ownership types. Since the PSM estimates suggest that the extensive margin is of
primary importance, I test this more formally in this section.
A more sophisticated alternative to Tobit model, that allows to separate the two
margins, is Heckman selection model, which introduces a second latent variable that
allows the process of reporting zero taxable prots and the outcome to be independent
from each other, conditional on x.
y2it = fy

2it if y

1it > 0
0 if y1it  0
(7)
In Heckman selection model the variables determining whether a company reports
positive prot are separate from the variables determining how much prot a company
is reporting once it decides to do so at all. Therefore, the rst equation would determine
why companies report positive prots
(1) y1it = zit + eit (8)
(2) dit = 1 if y1it > 0 and dit = 0 if y

1it  0 (9)
where y1it is a latent variable indicating the utility from reporting taxable prots, dit
is an indicator for prot reporting status, zit denotes the determinants of this status, 
is a vector of associated parameter estimates, and eit is an error term with a standard
normal distribution.
The second equation involves estimating a regression of taxable prots scaled by total
assets conditional on dit = 1 and a vector of explanatory variables xit . This would be
the same equation as the one estimated in the OLS model
53
y2it = + 1multinationali + Xit + indi + yeart + uit: (10)
The model, which comprises an equation determining sample selection and a regres-
sion model conditional on dit = 1, is estimated jointly using the maximum likelihood
technique, with (eit; uit) assumed to be bivariate normal. For identication purposes es-
timating Heckman selection model requires at least one variable in the rst stage (part
of zit) that is not a determinant in second stage (not part of xit).
Crucially, the distinction between (Heckman) selection models and (Tobit) censored
regression models could be important if there is heterogeneity within the sample of multi-
nationals, for example between aggressive tax avoiders (which reported zero taxable
prots most of the time) and unsophisticated tax planners(which report zero taxable
prots no more frequently than domestic standalones). In that case the binary part of
the selection model is where the di¤erences lay and that would be reected appropriately
in a selection model, but not in a Tobit.
This suggest that including dummies for (e.g.) reporting zero taxable prots in at
least 2 of the last 3 years in the probit part of the Heckman procedure, could help
identication. Further variables that could be considered as identifying factors in the rst
stage regression can be for example the presence of a tax haven parent which determines
whether a company is an aggressive tax avoider. This will a¤ect whether it decides to
report any prots in the UK or whether it shifts everything to, for example, its tax haven
headquarter. The presence of the tax haven parent per se does not a¤ect the protability
of the company in the UK. Another variable that I could potentially use in zit could be
last years losses carried forward. In box 4 in the tax return form, each company has
to report whether is has any losses from previous periods that it wants to use to o¤set
against taxable prots in this period. They a¤ect whether the company reports zero
taxable prots as it can use those losses to reduce its taxable prots to zero, but they do
not a¤ect how much prot the company made this year. Additionally, I use the average
industry turnover, which approximates the business cycle uctuations that would a¤ect
the proportion of companies reporting zero taxable prots in a particular year. Average
industry turnover is calculated for each year and each 2 digit industry code using mean
trading turnover from the CT600 data.
I use those four variables together with total assets in the rst stage equation that
determines whether a company reports zero or positive prots (zit). In the second stage
equation I use the same variables as in the case of the OLS model discussed in Section
6.1.
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6.2.1 Results from the Heckman selection model specications
Tables 13 and 14 show the results from estimating the Heckman selection model. Table 13
shows second stage marginal e¤ects while Table 14 shows rst stage coe¢ cients from the
binary part of the distribution. Note that in the rst stage regressions the zero taxable
prots dummy is coded as 1 when positive taxable prots arise (reverse of what it is in
the LDV estimations in section 6.1). This is dues to the specic nature of the Heckman
selection model, whereby in the rst stage one estimates the determinants of reporting
positive prots. Therefore negative coe¢ cients shown in Table 14 correspond directly to
the positive ones from LDV regressions.
Column 1 estimates the model using unrestricted sample of foreign multinational sub-
sidiaries and domestic standalones, while columns 2- 6 use the propensity score matched
sample and experiment with various sets of explanatory variables, dened above, in the
rst stage regression.
First, in most of the estimations the inverse mills ratio - lambda (which estimates
the signicance of the selection problem) is signicant suggesting that selection into
reporting positive taxable prots is indeed an issue in my data. The most important
feature of Tables 13 and 14 is that the estimates of the coe¢ cient on the multinational
dummy are larger and always signicant in the rst stage regressions. This suggests that
being a multinational signicantly negatively a¤ects whether the company will report
any taxable prots in the UK. Once a company reports positive taxable prots in the
UK, being a multinational substantially reduces the reported ratio of taxable prots to
total assets relative to domestic standalone in unrestricted sample only (column 1 Table
13). When I use comparable companies as matched through PSM, the coe¢ cient on the
multinational dummy in the second stage becomes much smaller and often insignicant.
This suggests that being a multinational matters less once you report positive taxable
prots (columns 2 and 3). What is more, column 1 results from second stage suggest
that larger (unmatched) foreign MNCs report lower ratios of taxable prots to total assets
than smaller (unmatched) domestic standalone, conditional on reporting positive taxable
prots.
When the coe¢ cients from the rst stage regressions are converted to marginal e¤ects,
their magnitude oscillates around 0.3, which means that they are very similar to the ones
obtained using PSM method.
In columns 4-6 I use dummies signifying zero taxable prot reporting; either for the
last two out of 3 years (ztp2yrs), last year (ztp_11), 2 years ago (ztp_12), etc. However,
the coe¢ cient on lambda is insignicant in those regressions, which would suggest that
selection is not a problem anymore. In columns 4-6 the coe¢ cient on a multinational
dummy in the second stage of Heckman selection model is marginally signicant and
negative which would suggest that being a multinational marginally reduces the taxable
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prots of positive taxable prot reporting companies relative to domestic standalones.
Importantly, this coe¢ cient is much smaller and much less signicant than the one from
the rst stage regression on the binary part of the distribution.
The results from Heckman selection model broadly conrm the impression also gained
from the propensity score matching methodology. There is little or no di¤erence be-
tween matched (smaller) foreign multinational subsidiaries and matched (larger) domes-
tic standalones, conditional on reporting positive taxable prots. In turn, the results
from the rst stage show that being a multinational matters signicantly for reporting
zero taxable prots.
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Table 14: Heckman selection model estimation results - rst stage.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1st stage results       
       
multinational -0.936*** -0.769*** -0.769*** -0.651*** -0.774*** -0.673*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln_total_assets 0.071*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ztp2yrs -1.138*** -1.176*** -1.176*** 0.132*** -1.343***  
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005)  
avg_indyrtrturnover 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
previous_losses_ta -0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.005***   
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
tax_haven -0.011 -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.052***   
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)   
lastyr_loss -0.777*** -0.514*** -0.514*** 0.170***   
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)   
ztp_l1    -1.473***  -1.359*** 
    (0.007)  (0.005) 
ztp_l2    -0.400***  -0.327*** 
    (0.009)  (0.006) 
ztp_l3    -0.185***  -0.147*** 
    (0.008)  (0.007) 
ztp_l4    -0.078***  -0.084*** 
    (0.008)  (0.007) 
ztp_l5    -0.071***  -0.075*** 
    (0.008)  (0.008) 
ztp_l6    -0.074***  -0.078*** 
    (0.008)  (0.008) 
lambda -0.075*** -0.108*** -0.093*** -0.017 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) 
Constant 0.230*** 0.858*** 0.858*** 0.827*** 0.648*** 0.815*** 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Observations 2,894,020 488,431 488,431 488,431 521,234 521,234 
Industry FE YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES NO NO NO NO 
St err cluster YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Type of matching - propensity 
score 
propensity 
score 
propensity 
score 
propensity 
score 
propensity 
score 	
Note: Results from the Heckman selection model estimation, rst stage coe¢ cients. The sample is
foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic standalones, Columns 1 - 6 show results using various
rst stage variables. Selected sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
58
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper series recent papers
WP1712 Edward D. Kleinbard The right tax at the right time
WP1711 Aaron Flaaen The role of transfer prices in profit-shifting by U.S. multinational
firms: Evidence from the 2004 Homeland Investment Act
WP1710 Ruud de Mooij and Li Liu At a cost: The real effect of transfer pricing regulations
on multinational investments
WP1709 Wei Cui Taxation without information: The institutional foundations of modern
tax collection
WP17/08 John Brooks The definitions of income
WP17/07 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella Implications of Digitalization for
International Corporation Tax Reform
WP17/06 Richard Collier and Michael P. Devereux The Destination–Based Cash Flow Tax
and the Double Tax Treaties
WP17/05 Li Liu Where does multinational investment go with Territorial Taxation
WP17/04 Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P Devereux and Federica Liberini Taxes and Location
of Targets
WP17/03 Johannes Becker and Joachim Englisch A European Perspective on the US plans
for a Destination based cash flow tax
WP17/02 Andreas Haufler, Mohammed Mardan and Dirk Schindler Double tax
discrimination to attract FDI and fight profit shifting: The role of CFC rules
WP17/01 Alan Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen and John Vella Destination-
based cash flow taxation
WP16/14 Anzhela Cédelle The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: A UK Perspective
WP16/13 Michael Devereux Measuring corporation tax uncertainty across countries:
Evidence from a cross-country survey
WP16/12 Andreas Haufler and Ulf Maier Regulatory competition in capital standards with
selection effects among banks
WP16/11 Katarzyna Habu Are financing constraints binding for investment? Evidence from
natural experiment
WP 16/10 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches, voluntary registration and bunching:
Theory and UK evidence
WP 16/09 Harry Grubert and Roseanne Altshuler Shifting the burden of taxation from the
corporate to the personal level and getting the corporate tax rate down to 15 percent
WP 16/08 Margaret K McKeehan and George R Zodrow Balancing act: weighing the
factors affecting the taxation of capital income in a small open economy
WP 16/07 Michael P Devereux and Li Liu Stimulating investment through incorporation
WP16/05 Tobias Böhm, Nadine Riedel and Martin Simmler Large and influential: firm size
and governments’ corporate tax rate choice?
WP16/04 Dhammika Dharmapala The economics of corporate and business tax reform
WP 16/03 Rita de la Feria EU VAT principles as interpretative aids to EU VAT rules: the
inherent paradox
WP 16/02 Irem Guceri Will the real R&D employees please stand up? Effects of tax breaks
on firm level outcomes
WP 16/01 Giorgia Maffini, Jing Xing and Michael P Devereux The impact of investment
incentives: evidence from UK corporation tax returns
WP 15/33 Anzhela Cédelle Enhanced co-operation: a way forward for tax harmonisation
in the EU?
WP 15/32 James Mahon and Eric Zwick Do experts help firms optimise?
WP 15/31 Robin Boadway, Motohiro Sato and Jean-François Tremblay Cash-flow business
taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information
WP 15/30 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal
debt financing and transfer pricing on capital accumulation
WP 15/29 Daniel Shaviro The crossroads versus the seesaw: getting a 'fix' on recent
international tax policy developments
WP 15/28 Zhonglan Dai, Douglas A Shackelford, Yue (Layla) Ying and Harold H Zhang Do
companies invest more after shareholder tax cuts?
WP 15/27 Martin Ruf and Julia Schmider Who bears the cost of taxing the rich? An
empirical study on CEO pay
WP 15/26 Eric Orhn The corporate investment response to the domestic production
activities deduction
WP 15/25 Li Liu International taxation and MNE investment: evidence from the UK change
to territoriality
WP 15/24 Edward D Kleinbard Reimagining capital income taxation
WP 15/23 James R Hines Jr, Niklas Potrafke, Marina Riem and Christoph Schinke Inter
vivos transfers of ownership in family firms
WP 15/22 Céline Azémar and Dhammika Dharmapala Tax sparing agreements, territorial
tax reforms, and foreign direct investment
WP 15/21 Wei Cui A critical review of proposals for destination-based cash-flow
corporate taxation as an international tax reform option
WP 15/20 Andrew Bird and Stephen A Karolyi Governance and taxes: evidence from
regression discontinuity
WP 15/19 Reuven Avi-Yonah Reinventing the wheel: what we can learn from the Tax
Reform Act of 1986
WP 15/18 Annette Alstadsæter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria
Skonieczna and Antonio Vezzani Patent boxes design, patents,location and local R&D
WP 15/17 Laurent Bach Do better entrepreneurs avoid more taxes?
WP 15/16 Nadja Dwenger, Frank M Fossen and Martin Simmler From financial to real
economic crisis: evidence from individual firm–bank relationships in Germany
WP 15/15 Giorgia Maffini and John Vella Evidence-based policy-making? The
Commission's proposal for an FTT
WP 15/14 Clemens Fuest and Jing Xing How can a country 'graduate' from procyclical
fiscal policy? Evidence from China?
WP 15/13 Richard Collier and Giorgia Maffini The UK international tax agenda for business
and the impact of the OECD BEPS project
WP 15/12 Irem Guceri and Li Liu Effectiveness of fiscal incentives for R&D: quasi-
experimental evidence
WP 15/11 Irem Guceri Tax incentives and R&D: an evaluation of the 2002 UK reform using
micro data
WP 15/10 Rita de la Feria and Parintira Tanawong Surcharges and penalties in UK tax law
WP 15/09 Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij, Michael Keen Base erosion, profit-shifting and
developing countries
WP 15/08 Judith Freedman Managing tax complexity: the institutional framework for tax
policy-making and oversight
WP 15/07 Michael P Devereux, Giorgia Maffini and Jing Xing Corporate tax incentives and
capital structure: empirical evidence from UK tax returns
WP 15/06 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches
WP 15/05 Clemens Fuest and Li Liu Does ownership affect the impact of taxes on firm
behaviour? Evidence from China.
WP 15/04 Michael P Devereux, Clemens Fuest and Ben Lockwood The taxation of foreign
profits: a unified view
WP 15/03 Jitao Tang and Rosanne Altshuler The spillover effects of outward foreign direct
investment on home countries: evidence from the United States
WP 15/02 Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato and Owen Zidar Who benefits from state corporate
tax cuts? A local labour markets approach with heterogeneous firms
WP 15/01 Ronald B Davies, Julien Martin, Mathieu Parenti and Farid Toubal Knocking on
Tax Haven’s Door: multinational firms and transfer pricing
WP14/29 Anzhela Yevgenyeva The taxation of non-profit organizations after Stauffer
WP 14/28 Peter Birch Sørensen Taxation of shareholder income and the cost of capital in a
small open economy
WP 14/27 Peter Birch Sørensen Taxation and the optimal constraint on corporate debt
finance
WP 14/26 Johannes Becker, Ronald B Davies and Gitte Jakobs The economics of advance
pricing agreements
WP 14/25 Michael P Devereux and John Vella Are we heading towards a corporate tax
system fit for the 21st century?
WP 14/24 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal
debt financing on capital accumulation
WP 14/23 Ben Lockwood and Erez Yerushalmi Should transactions services be taxed at
the same rate as consumption?
WP 14/22 Chris Sanchirico As American as Apple Inc: International tax and ownership
nationality
WP 14/19 Jörg Paetzold and Hannes Winner Taking the High Road? Compliance with
commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers
WP 14/18 David Gamage How should governments promote distributive justice?: A
framework for analyzing the optimal choice of tax instruments
WP 14/16 Scott D Dyreng, Jeffrey L Hoopes and Jaron H Wilde Public pressure and
corporate tax behaviour
WP 14/15 Eric Zwick and James Mahon Do financial frictions amplify fiscal policy?
Evidence from business investment stimulus
WP 14/14 David Weisbach The use of neutralities in international tax policy
WP 14/13 Rita de la Feria Blueprint for reform of VAT rates in Europe
WP 14/12 Miguel Almunia and David Lopez Rodriguez Heterogeneous responses to
effective tax enforcement: evidence from Spanish firms
WP 14/11 Charles E McLure, Jack Mintz and George R Zodrow US Supreme Court
unanimously chooses substance over form in foreign tax credit
WP 14/10 David Neumark and Helen Simpson Place-based policies
WP 14/09 Johannes Becker and Ronald B Davies A negotiation-based model of tax-
induced transfer pricing
WP 14/08 Marko Koethenbuerger and Michael Stimmelmayr Taxing multinationals in the
presence of internal capital markets
WP 14/07 Michael Devereux and Rita de la Feria Designing and implementing a
destination-based corporate tax
WP 14/05 John W Diamond and George R Zodrow The dynamic economic effects of a US
corporate income tax rate reduction
WP 14/04 Claudia Keser, Gerrit Kimpel and Andreas Oesterricher The CCCTB option – an
experimental study
WP 14/03 Arjan Lejour The foreign investment effects of tax treaties
WP 14/02 Ralph-C. Bayer Harald Oberhofer and Hannes Winner The occurrence of tax
amnesties: theory and evidence
WP14/01 Nils Herger, Steve McCorriston and Christos Kotsogiannisz Multiple taxes and
alternative forms of FDI: evidence from cross-border acquisitions
